Truth within critical theory

Deconstructing the epistemology of the 'woke'

Given the millions of words that have already been written, whether promoting, criticising or confused by, wokeness, critical theory and cancel culture, it is probably foolish to add to them here. Nevertheless, the concepts of epistemic confidence and humility introduced previously here can shed some light on these ways of thinking.

Before we get into it, a couple of caveats are necessary. The first is to acknowledge that there is no settled convention about what to name the various ways of thinking explored here or even the extent to which they form a coherent intellectual approach. Regardless of what the ‘correct’ term is and the exact definition, this post will take a broad brush approach to the cluster of theories variously associated with deconstructionism, post-modernism, wokeness, post-colonialism, critical theory and the like. These various theories are all part of an ongoing intellectual tradition that was developed through thinkers like Derrida, Foucault, Adorno, Lyotard, Butler and others. For the sake of referring to this intellectual tradition, including the various cultural and societal offshoots of it such as analyses in terms of structural racism and white privilege, I will use the term critical theory in this post to refer to the whole tradition.

The second caveat is to emphasise that the analysis that follows is only a partial account of a complex set of theories and societal practices. It is unashamedly focused on the core philosophical assumptions at play in critical theory. It is important to remember, however, that few people consistently follow (or understand) the core philosophical commitments of their worldview. Many other factors are relevant to understanding people’s behaviour, including personal interests, human frailties, and social dynamics. However, a core philosophy shapes how people think and what is considered acceptable or possible – and so significantly, but not completely, shapes the decisions and actions of those who follow it.

Finally, it should be remembered that this essay is an analysis of epistemology: the ways by which we decide whether something is true or to accept it as a fact. It is not arguing for or against any theory, although readers will no doubt come to their own conclusions.

The epistemology of critical theory

Famously, Jean Francois Lyotard described the core attitude of postmodernism as “incredulity towards metanarratives”. As a statement of limited belief in grand explanations or comprehensive theories that describe reality, Lyotard was expressing a striking and strong statement of epistemic humility. Human knowledge is, to Lyotard and the broader postmodern approach, limited, contextual and instantiated in societies and cultures. As such there are strong limits to what humans can know. Many argue that the postmodern approach goes further and advances a deep skepticism about the existence of any genuine knowledge.

Despite the deep epistemic humility embodied in the heart of critical theory and postmodernism, proponents of critical theory exhibit little uncertainty about the correctness of their view and are often vociferous in attacking those who disagree with them. A difference between a theory and those practicing is often traced back to hypocrisy, human fallibilities or social pressures. While these may often be at play, more important is understanding the epistemological commitments at the heart of critical theory.

These are easiest to see by tracing the development of ideas first advanced by Michel Foucault. He famously deconstructed traditional conceptions of knowledge, arguing instead that they are essentially connected to, and often indistinguishable from, societal power structures. He considered that power and knowledge were unavoidably connected and could not be separated. This means that the accepted truths within a society need to be understood as means by which the hegemonic powers reinforce their own power and status.

For Foucault, therefore, epistemology - deciding what knowledge is or what is true - necessarily involves analyses of power structures in society. In other words, it involves realms of inquiry that were traditionally considered as parts of political or moral philosophy.

While Foucault was primarily concerned with descriptive analyses of society and ideas, those following it have extended this insight in a more normative direction. The moral or political components have become, often implicitly, an important component of how we should decide to accept claims, or take them as true. This means that accepting a claim as true becomes less about the relation of the claim to any external reality, and is much more a political or moral act that either supports or rejects power structures within society. In this way of thinking, the slogan ‘everything is political’ should be taken very literally: what we take to be true or not is a decision about power.

Looking at an example might make this clearer. Let's pick a fairly topical assertion: The police in the US are unfairly targeting black people. A traditional approach to epistemology would consider this as true or not depending on an analysis of various incidents and statistics and comparing police treatment of various racial groupings. For those inspired by Foucault’s analysis, the question about whether to consider it as true depends on the power structures that would be supported or challenged by agreeing to the statement. Thus for critical theory accepting or rejecting any assertion turns into a moral act, not primarily a decision about facts, evidence or an external reality.

Morality as epistemic confidence

While this is a distinctive approach to epistemology, Foucault’s position is consistent with the epistemic humility expressed by Lyotard. If the incredulity towards metanarratives extends to an incredulity about comprehensive analyses of societal power structures, then this epistemology will encourage uncertainty about whether to support or reject different statements.

However, in practice, critical theory has gone further than just replacing epistemological questions with political and moral questions, but provided a clear framework for settling the moral questions inherent in questions about power. To simplify a complex set of theories that has evolved over decades, the correct moral attitude is to support the marginalised or oppressed against the hegemonic power structures or entrenched systems of privilege. This provides clarity as to the moral action to be taken, and rules out questions about whether to support or reject assertions. There is a clear moral answer. In this way, the epistemic humility expressed by Lyotard is replaced in practice by moral certainty.

To go back to the example, agreeing with or asserting “The police in the US are unfairly targeting black people” is a moral act concerning whether you support the historically marginalised black population or the existing system of entrenched privilege. Deciding whether such a statement is true and whether to agree with it is not, on this way of thinking, about evidence but a moral decision. If you accept the power analysis focused on marginalisation, then there is no doubt about the right decision and therefore that this statement is correct, i.e. true.

As a system of epistemology, critical theory and deconstructionism is a very interesting case study. In reference to traditional norms of epistemology, it expresses a profound epistemic humility that trends towards a thorough skepticism. However, these thinkers put politics and moral judgements in the traditional place of questions of truth and knowledge, which drives a thorough epistemic certainty. We can know (on this way of thinking) that certain claims are definitely true because of the inherent moral judgements.

Our cultural moment

The previous post on our apocalyptic mood argued that our society is increasingly divided by fundamentally different epistemologies. The epistemology of critical theory, if the analysis above is correct, is one of these. It is accepted (to various degrees) by many within society but is both rejected and not understood by many others. This contributes to the sclerotic nature of many public debates today.

Debates where one side treats agreeing with statements as primarily or significantly a moral action (rejecting or supporting hegemonic power) while another is focused on evidence or data is akin to trying to play a game where different sides don't agree on any of the rules or how to win.

Understanding these differences can help improve the quality of debate - at least to hopefully shift the debate into areas where genuine discussion can be had. You need not agree with a different epistemology, or even think it is rational, to benefit from understanding it.

For example, many of the features of critical theory and 'wokeness' that critics take to be outlandish or evidence of insanity are coherent within the intellectual framework. To pick one example that gets periodically raised, there has been an academic call for a feminist glaciology. Within critical theory as explained here, the point of this is not primarily to better describe glaciers but to undertake the moral task of challenging the historically privileged power structures embedded in existing theories. You may still disagree with this, but it should make some more sense.

Readers who find thinking grounded in critical theory unconvincing are likely to find the centrality of moral and political judgements to critical theory helps make many puzzling claims easier to follow, even if they don’t find it makes them more plausible.

Similarly, understanding epistemological assumptions may also be useful for those who are baffled by the widespread opposition to challenging privilege or tackling systemic racism. Unlike within critical theory, many people adhere to a sharp distinction between the epistemic and the moral value of assertions or statements. Whether a statement is true is different to whether it is good. The first is a reflection of how well the statement factually describes an external, independent reality. The second reflects whether we think reality should be that way or not. On this traditional approach, rejecting a factual claim about, say, the spread of racism is distinct from any moral support for racism.

As a final cultural reflection, it is increasingly common to see arguments that ‘wokeness' has become, or taken on the forms of, a new religion. This is unsurprising for any way of thinking that replaces epistemology with morality. Any way of thinking that replaces questions about what is or isn't true with moral judgements will inevitably take on, or appear to have, some religious characteristics.