Beginnings
Introducing Epistemic Humility and Epistemic Confidence
Modern Western philosophy is generally considered to have begun with the works of Plato - and through him to Socrates. Plato's influence is such that, in the early twentieth century, AN Whitehead claimed that 'the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.' Intriguingly however, Plato and Socrates had opposing views on a fundamental, but underappreciated, assumption about human knowledge - namely to what extent genuine knowledge is possible. These opposing views have set up a dialectic or tension that has influenced and driven Western philosophy ever since.
"I know that I know nothing." With a conviction like this,1 and a ready willingness to demonstrate that others didn't know anything either, Socrates established himself as an intellectual gadfly within the Athenian society of his day. As such he is a memorable proponent of a position that we will call Epistemic Humility. In short, this is the belief that genuine knowledge is difficult to acquire for everyone, even with the best of care and attention. There are a range of views that fit under this umbrella term and it is often more of an an attitude or a conviction about human abilities, rather than a developed philosophical thesis or position.
Socrates vigorously prosecuted his belief in epistemic humility by forensically questioning existing authorities and views with the aim of undermining others' confidence in their beliefs. He often sought to show that what they thought of as established knowledge was only personal or customary beliefs. As is well known, Socrates' epistemic humility, and these efforts to inculcate that humility in others, cost him his place in Athenian society and eventually his life.
In contrast to epistemic humility, Epistemic Confidence is the belief that humans can acquire knowledge, and wide ranging knowledge, with complete or at least considerable certainty. And Plato, for one, rejected Socrates' attitude of humility and expressed a profound, but circumscribed, epistemic confidence. For Plato, truth and knowledge were not only possible to achieve, but the properly trained philosopher could acquire certainty about knowledge and could be completely relied upon for their judgements. Achieving knowledge required leaving the visible world, moving through the intelligible world and then grasping the perfect Forms that constitute true knowledge.2
Socrates advanced a stringent form of epistemic humility and, partially in response, Plato developed a sophisticated and detail account of what knowledge is and how it is possible to justify his epistemic confidence. This dialectic, between arguments for humility about knowledge and philosophical projects to regain confidence, often certainty, in our knowledge, has continued through the history of philosophy. Exploring the dialectic both over time and within different philosophies, and especially the various methods by which thinkers tried to ground their epistemic confidence, will be one project explored through this Substack.
More broadly, exploring epistemic humility and confidence in a wide range of contexts is the raison d'etre for collecting my thoughts and writing here. It is an important, and insightful, distinction for many topics, from societal analysis, to thinking about research practices, to personal practices and improvements and well beyond. I will explore a range of these over time, and will be looking to my readers over time for inspiration for topics.
Before I finish these Beginnings, I want to clarify a couple of points about the concepts of epistemic confidence and humility.
Firstly, the concept of epistemic humility is often referred to in a psychological or character sense - it is a virtue or a personal attitude. This is relevant and will come up but my primary focus will be the more philosophical approach taking humility and confidence as intellectual attitudes or convictions. This is important as these don't always coincide. For example, from what we know Socrates displayed little personal humility - yet his primary (stated) conclusions exhibited a profound intellectual and epistemic humility. Moreover, we are most interested in epistemic humility and confidence as intellectual convictions about humans generally rather than personal attitudes or what I might think about myself.
Secondly, for the philosopically minded, what we are referring to as epistemic humility is distinct from philosphical scepticism - although there are significant overlaps. To take one simple example, one can have supreme epistemic confidence in the sceptical belief that the world doesn't exist, so long as one believes that it is certain that that conclusion is true. Similarly, epistemic humility is not compatible with a thorough-going philosophical scepticism about knowledge that confidently concludes that knowing what is true is impossible. It may be useful to think of epistemic humility, in terms we use every day, as a healthy scepticism about knowledge, rather than a complete scepticism. That said, many sceptical arguments are also arguments for philosophical humility.
We have only covered the basic concepts here and there is much more to be explained. All this will come but feel free to ask questions or challenge my thinking through the comments.
There are various forms of this sentiment attributed to Socrates and some debate over what he actually meant. Wikipedia has a good summary: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing
This is a complex topic. But a short explanation can be found at https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/plato-the-theory-of-knowledge-philosophy-essay.php