Loved. The argument is coming together nicely. Each of the six points contains wisdom. I wonder, however, if point six creates a difficulty in that knowledge built on experience and emotion is uniquely personal making it impossible (or at least very difficult) to transfer knowledge accurately to others even when our mind is open to them being potentially right (point 4). I wonder further whether this creates a 'gap' that can only be filled with false confidence - that is our ability to share knowledge is necessarily based on a shared, but individualised, false confidence in our ability to judge what is right (or at least right enough). At a macro level, epistemic humility becomes a rationale for greater tolerance - which I agree is essential for societal harmony and progress.
Thanks. Really interesting question that goes in lots of different directions. I'll consider more properly when I write more about point six - which will come but might take some time.
I'm not so sure though that experience and emotion are uniquely personal. We might each have a unique mix, but emotions (at least) are are pretty similar across people and easily shared/communicated. I think humans probably can transfer emotions more easily and powerfully than rational concepts.
This needs the caveat that there is a lot more to be said about the role of emotions in knowledge (e.g. they are clearly not reliable and sometimes they are a contra-indicator as, say, the warm feeling of self-righteousness often means that confirmation bias has kicked in).
Yes. You make a good point about transferring emotions and the extent to which they are shared, at least broadly. But as knowledge become more precise I suspect that emotions might play a confounding role.
Loved. The argument is coming together nicely. Each of the six points contains wisdom. I wonder, however, if point six creates a difficulty in that knowledge built on experience and emotion is uniquely personal making it impossible (or at least very difficult) to transfer knowledge accurately to others even when our mind is open to them being potentially right (point 4). I wonder further whether this creates a 'gap' that can only be filled with false confidence - that is our ability to share knowledge is necessarily based on a shared, but individualised, false confidence in our ability to judge what is right (or at least right enough). At a macro level, epistemic humility becomes a rationale for greater tolerance - which I agree is essential for societal harmony and progress.
Thanks. Really interesting question that goes in lots of different directions. I'll consider more properly when I write more about point six - which will come but might take some time.
I'm not so sure though that experience and emotion are uniquely personal. We might each have a unique mix, but emotions (at least) are are pretty similar across people and easily shared/communicated. I think humans probably can transfer emotions more easily and powerfully than rational concepts.
This needs the caveat that there is a lot more to be said about the role of emotions in knowledge (e.g. they are clearly not reliable and sometimes they are a contra-indicator as, say, the warm feeling of self-righteousness often means that confirmation bias has kicked in).
Yes. You make a good point about transferring emotions and the extent to which they are shared, at least broadly. But as knowledge become more precise I suspect that emotions might play a confounding role.