An interesting theme from your writing is the use of science as society's most developed method for determining truth. In doing so, you have rightly pointed to its flaws. This is an effective argument for supporting epistemic humility an individual and societal level.
Checking theories feels important. But I wonder if 'check theories, not facts' is too cute. Perhaps 'check theories to understand facts' or 'understand theories to make sense of facts' might be more helpful. Facts remain important (even they themselves are uncertain and undefinable). It is just that the link between fact and action usually runs through a contestable theory.
My sense is that the value of theory for people in practice is that it does two things. Both of these use a simple 'if, then' framework. First, theory provides a basis for defining truth from partial information without seeking to explore further. For example, theory might lead you to say that inequality is bad for society. The result is that any increase/decrease in inequality becomes bad/good on its own. Second, theory provides a basis for action (this in effect reverses the logic flow). For example, for a good society to exist, inequality must be reduced.
One of the issues I see is that theory (outside a strict and limited scientific application) tends to work as a mechanism for making sense of a limited 'constellation' of facts rather than an individual fact. If true, does this mean that theories can be understood as models developed to explain a particular constellation of facts (and relationships between facts) at a particular point in time. These models are then applied to a broader constellation of facts (and changing relationships between them) in the real world.
All this adds to your case for humility of course.
My formulation is probably a bit cute, but it made a good title!
More seriously, you have highlighted one language issue I'm running up against. I'm using the word 'theory' but the same arguments also hold for models, worldviews, paradigms, consistent gut feelings, and anything like that. I'm normally allergic to coining entire new terms, but also there isn't a good word for what I'm referring to. I tend to use theory as the most accessible terms that belongs to the family of 'abstracted representations' that form our human knowledge.
Yup, a really good title. And well worth a bit of over-cuteness.
I suspect that others (Anthea Roberts for example) might use 'narrative' to mean a similar thing to 'abstracted representation'. Both work for me. I suspect the key is to understand that there is a family of terms which describe a similar thinking process. This might be worth exploring more specifically in a future post.
If you were to explore, I wonder whether it might be worth considering the difference between sense-making and truth-seeking. Sense-making, for me anyway, is suggestive of a process which gives a level of confidence for decision-making as an individual or collective. Truth-seeking is the pursuit of a truth that clearly sits above all other 'truths' (one truth to rule them all sort of thing). Philosophers are naturally disposed to searching for truth, whereas the rest of the world may well be happy with what using what makes sense (to them) even if this is both limited and flawed. In the pursuit of truth, humility is essential. For sense making, humility is important but at some point enough confidence must exist to provide a basis for practical decision making. Problems arise when people confuse sense-making with truth, as it causes them to deny the sense making of others.
An interesting theme from your writing is the use of science as society's most developed method for determining truth. In doing so, you have rightly pointed to its flaws. This is an effective argument for supporting epistemic humility an individual and societal level.
Checking theories feels important. But I wonder if 'check theories, not facts' is too cute. Perhaps 'check theories to understand facts' or 'understand theories to make sense of facts' might be more helpful. Facts remain important (even they themselves are uncertain and undefinable). It is just that the link between fact and action usually runs through a contestable theory.
My sense is that the value of theory for people in practice is that it does two things. Both of these use a simple 'if, then' framework. First, theory provides a basis for defining truth from partial information without seeking to explore further. For example, theory might lead you to say that inequality is bad for society. The result is that any increase/decrease in inequality becomes bad/good on its own. Second, theory provides a basis for action (this in effect reverses the logic flow). For example, for a good society to exist, inequality must be reduced.
One of the issues I see is that theory (outside a strict and limited scientific application) tends to work as a mechanism for making sense of a limited 'constellation' of facts rather than an individual fact. If true, does this mean that theories can be understood as models developed to explain a particular constellation of facts (and relationships between facts) at a particular point in time. These models are then applied to a broader constellation of facts (and changing relationships between them) in the real world.
All this adds to your case for humility of course.
My formulation is probably a bit cute, but it made a good title!
More seriously, you have highlighted one language issue I'm running up against. I'm using the word 'theory' but the same arguments also hold for models, worldviews, paradigms, consistent gut feelings, and anything like that. I'm normally allergic to coining entire new terms, but also there isn't a good word for what I'm referring to. I tend to use theory as the most accessible terms that belongs to the family of 'abstracted representations' that form our human knowledge.
Yup, a really good title. And well worth a bit of over-cuteness.
I suspect that others (Anthea Roberts for example) might use 'narrative' to mean a similar thing to 'abstracted representation'. Both work for me. I suspect the key is to understand that there is a family of terms which describe a similar thinking process. This might be worth exploring more specifically in a future post.
If you were to explore, I wonder whether it might be worth considering the difference between sense-making and truth-seeking. Sense-making, for me anyway, is suggestive of a process which gives a level of confidence for decision-making as an individual or collective. Truth-seeking is the pursuit of a truth that clearly sits above all other 'truths' (one truth to rule them all sort of thing). Philosophers are naturally disposed to searching for truth, whereas the rest of the world may well be happy with what using what makes sense (to them) even if this is both limited and flawed. In the pursuit of truth, humility is essential. For sense making, humility is important but at some point enough confidence must exist to provide a basis for practical decision making. Problems arise when people confuse sense-making with truth, as it causes them to deny the sense making of others.