This post and your previous one on whether computers can think reminded me of some Twitter wisdom I came across the other day: “Humans are feelers with a rationalizing organ called a brain, not rational decision-makers.” Sadly no citations underlying it: https://mobile.twitter.com/MTrempley/status/1536491272797663232
Really enjoyed both the piece and conversation. You pose a really interesting question. Some very random thoughts.
I wonder whether Damasio's work provides evidence for epistemic humility. If it is not possible, without emotion, to settle on an answer is this because rationality demands an acceptance that all knowledge is uncertain and may be wrong? This assumes, of course, that unfettered rationality requires the prospect of a certain truth to operate effectively.
Your rope analogy is really interesting. The idea of thinking processes working together to reveal truth is implicitly attractive. If we accept emotion is a 'strand', the question for me is whether it is a reliable one. Does it truly support the rest of the rope or not?
I wonder whether emotion creates 'skin in the game' and a reason to form a view. It is here that the role of emotion differs from that of intuition. Intuition can, I think, exist without 'skin in the game' but emotion can not. I suspect the two things are very difficult to separate in practice, leading to an assumed granting of the attributes of one to the other.
Finally, I have been assuming our use of knowledge is directed at something universal and unchanging (within a clear context) rather than a personal truth (belief) which need not be shared, let alone be universally. I would suggest that emotion plays a strong role in the creation of personal truths and in encouraging us to see these as universal. Whether this process plays a strong positive role in revealing universals truths, I am less certain.
Your point that Damasio's work provides direct evidence for epistemic humility is really interesting and not something I'd thought about. I like it.
You've picked up a limitation with the rope analogy but I haven't found a better one yet. It implies the processes work similarly and are equally reliable, whereas I wouldn't say that emotions don't contribute to knowledge in the same way as reason or experiences. But I haven't figured out a better way to describe yet. This might be a topic for a later post.
A culture can be mistaken about knowledge? Not necessarily the bits, the provisional 'information' and the partial and usually premature 'resolutions' that appear, but holding a 'belief' in the process that brought these about? Then there is that whole matter of the 'opinion sphere'. (smile)
I find the intuitive social space is interesting: negotiating resolution in mathematical thinking.
Roger Penrose: 'The Emperor's New Mind'; Chapt. 'Where Lies the Physics of Mind?' - particularly 'Non-verbality of thought'.
My further reading in anthropology:
Hugh Brody, The 'Other Side of Eden', Chapt. 'Mind', 'where direct experience and metaphor unite'
Alan Tormaid Campbell, 'Getting to Know Wai-wai', Chapt. 'Four, Fire and Giving', legend; 'How we stole fire from Jaguar'; humanity before speech.
And I often return to Alasdair MacIntyre, 'After Virtue', and the failure of reason to justify the moral injunctions of the utilitarians, (see the 'moral seriousness' of Sidgwick et al. and a failure of the project.)
Thanks for the references. I'm very interested in the intuitive but also whether and how emotions like anger, fear, excitement, contentment (etc) contribute to our knowledge processes.
And, on your opening paragraph, I think the question is more how any culture is mistaken about their beliefs in the process for getting knowledge than whether they are. How are we today going to look ridiculous to those in the future? Some points are fairly obvious, others are likely far less so.
I don't want to over extend my contribution to your discussion. Your essay has raised a good deal to think about.
I suppose I have taken for granted that emotions blend with experience and integrate with all kinds of knowledge in the groundstate for action / inaction and personal adjustment within community .
Are we both seeing 'knowledge' as a reference framework rather than an 'encyclopedia'? I have presumed that knowledge is largely shared or at least provides an overlapping frame of instances, boundary conditions etc. within an envelope of personal and social tolerance and explanation. (Emotions are variously constrained?)
I suppose that there is ever a dividing line between what is accepted as real or unreal, but this line can shift. I think for instance of the way that 'magical thinking' became excluded or compartmentalised in Western thought; for example early-on it was noticeable in the life of Isaaac Newton. This shift became the dominant mode for a whole culture. As an example, the emotional consequences of this shift contribute their peculiarities to the blend of family life, education and training as each modern generation re-capitulates a version of the learning process?
I still wonder whether a whole culture can cease making sense to itself, even on its own terms?
Those are some really interesting questions and I'll ponder a few of them as I write more. Just as I've given you a good deal to think about (which I take as a a very big compliment), you've given me some things to mull over. Thanks.
This post and your previous one on whether computers can think reminded me of some Twitter wisdom I came across the other day: “Humans are feelers with a rationalizing organ called a brain, not rational decision-makers.” Sadly no citations underlying it: https://mobile.twitter.com/MTrempley/status/1536491272797663232
Really enjoyed both the piece and conversation. You pose a really interesting question. Some very random thoughts.
I wonder whether Damasio's work provides evidence for epistemic humility. If it is not possible, without emotion, to settle on an answer is this because rationality demands an acceptance that all knowledge is uncertain and may be wrong? This assumes, of course, that unfettered rationality requires the prospect of a certain truth to operate effectively.
Your rope analogy is really interesting. The idea of thinking processes working together to reveal truth is implicitly attractive. If we accept emotion is a 'strand', the question for me is whether it is a reliable one. Does it truly support the rest of the rope or not?
I wonder whether emotion creates 'skin in the game' and a reason to form a view. It is here that the role of emotion differs from that of intuition. Intuition can, I think, exist without 'skin in the game' but emotion can not. I suspect the two things are very difficult to separate in practice, leading to an assumed granting of the attributes of one to the other.
Finally, I have been assuming our use of knowledge is directed at something universal and unchanging (within a clear context) rather than a personal truth (belief) which need not be shared, let alone be universally. I would suggest that emotion plays a strong role in the creation of personal truths and in encouraging us to see these as universal. Whether this process plays a strong positive role in revealing universals truths, I am less certain.
Your point that Damasio's work provides direct evidence for epistemic humility is really interesting and not something I'd thought about. I like it.
You've picked up a limitation with the rope analogy but I haven't found a better one yet. It implies the processes work similarly and are equally reliable, whereas I wouldn't say that emotions don't contribute to knowledge in the same way as reason or experiences. But I haven't figured out a better way to describe yet. This might be a topic for a later post.
A culture can be mistaken about knowledge? Not necessarily the bits, the provisional 'information' and the partial and usually premature 'resolutions' that appear, but holding a 'belief' in the process that brought these about? Then there is that whole matter of the 'opinion sphere'. (smile)
I find the intuitive social space is interesting: negotiating resolution in mathematical thinking.
Roger Penrose: 'The Emperor's New Mind'; Chapt. 'Where Lies the Physics of Mind?' - particularly 'Non-verbality of thought'.
My further reading in anthropology:
Hugh Brody, The 'Other Side of Eden', Chapt. 'Mind', 'where direct experience and metaphor unite'
Alan Tormaid Campbell, 'Getting to Know Wai-wai', Chapt. 'Four, Fire and Giving', legend; 'How we stole fire from Jaguar'; humanity before speech.
And I often return to Alasdair MacIntyre, 'After Virtue', and the failure of reason to justify the moral injunctions of the utilitarians, (see the 'moral seriousness' of Sidgwick et al. and a failure of the project.)
thanks
Phil
Thanks for the references. I'm very interested in the intuitive but also whether and how emotions like anger, fear, excitement, contentment (etc) contribute to our knowledge processes.
And, on your opening paragraph, I think the question is more how any culture is mistaken about their beliefs in the process for getting knowledge than whether they are. How are we today going to look ridiculous to those in the future? Some points are fairly obvious, others are likely far less so.
I don't want to over extend my contribution to your discussion. Your essay has raised a good deal to think about.
I suppose I have taken for granted that emotions blend with experience and integrate with all kinds of knowledge in the groundstate for action / inaction and personal adjustment within community .
Are we both seeing 'knowledge' as a reference framework rather than an 'encyclopedia'? I have presumed that knowledge is largely shared or at least provides an overlapping frame of instances, boundary conditions etc. within an envelope of personal and social tolerance and explanation. (Emotions are variously constrained?)
I suppose that there is ever a dividing line between what is accepted as real or unreal, but this line can shift. I think for instance of the way that 'magical thinking' became excluded or compartmentalised in Western thought; for example early-on it was noticeable in the life of Isaaac Newton. This shift became the dominant mode for a whole culture. As an example, the emotional consequences of this shift contribute their peculiarities to the blend of family life, education and training as each modern generation re-capitulates a version of the learning process?
I still wonder whether a whole culture can cease making sense to itself, even on its own terms?
Those are some really interesting questions and I'll ponder a few of them as I write more. Just as I've given you a good deal to think about (which I take as a a very big compliment), you've given me some things to mull over. Thanks.
I look forward to reading!
Phil